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The  “Common  Ground:  Renewing  the  Federal  Partnership  in  Quebec  and  the 
West”  workshop  explored,  among  other  things,  the  prospect  for  building  new 
bridges  between  Quebec  and  the  West.  This  prospect  raises  two  interesting 
conceptual questions: what  is being used to build the bridge, and who  is doing 
the building? My contribution  to  this bridge‐building discussion  focuses  less on 
the  building  materials  and  more  on  who  is  doing  the  building,  and  on  the 
durability of the bridge in the face of emergent challenges. 
Introduction 
The  articles  by  Harvey  Lazar,  Edward  McWhinney,  Eric  Montpetit,  John  Richards  and  Paul 
Thomas  identify  many  of  the  construction  materials  and  suggest  that,  on  balance,  the 
Government of Canada has added significantly to its stock since the election of the Conservative 
minority government in 2006.  Prime Minister Stephen Harper’s loosely defined notion of “open 




through  the  complex  interplay  of  provincial  and  federal  election  results.  Although  historically 
western Canadians might have yelled “too much,” today they are  largely disengaged from and 
disinterested  in  this  debate.  The  recognition  of  the  Québécois  nation,  for  example,  caused 
barely  a  stir  in  the  West;  provincial  governments  said  little,  and  even  the  radio  talk  shows 
pursued other  topics. Whereas  in  the past western Canadians placed a great deal of stress on 
symmetrical  models  of  federalism,  rejecting  any  notion  of  asymmetrical  federalism  for  the 
equality  of  provinces,  today  the  greater  flexibility  of  Harper’s  “open  federalism”  may  have 
considerable appeal. What Montpetit terms “disjointed incrementalism” might fly  in the West, 
although this is a term that defies ready public understanding. 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forge  common  ground.  Indeed,  Stephen Harper’s  government  has  generally  eschewed  formal 
intergovernmental  gatherings,  opting  instead  for  parliamentary  initiatives  such  as  that  to 
recognize  the  Québécois  nation.  Nor  has  the  Council  of  the  Federation  rushed  in  to  fill  this 
intergovernmental gap. The Council does meet, but does so with virtually no public visibility or 
noticeable  effect.  Certainly  the  Council  is  not  seen  as  brokering  any  new deal,  substantive  or 




of  Quebec  opinion  and  the  Quebec  vote.    There  has  been  nothing  low‐profile  about  this 
courtship,  and  its  merits  have  been  widely  discussed  within  Quebec.    However,  few  if  any 
Quebecers  have  seen  this  as  an  attempt  to  build  a  bridge  between  Quebec  and  the  West. 
Rather, they see  it as an effort to  increase Quebec’s comfort within Confederation, to address 






that  the West  is  a  very  diverse  region where  agreement  among  provincial  governments  on  a 
common set of political principles and priorities can never be assumed.  Like their counterparts 
in  Quebec,  western  Canadians  have  seen  the  Prime Minister’s  construction  project  first  and 
foremost  as  an  attempt  to  strength  his  electoral  appeal  in  Quebec,  and  second  to  increase 
Quebec’s  comfort  level  within  Confederation.  The  two  regional  communities  share  the  same 
perception; neither sees even the faint outline of a bridge. The focus of attention is on Quebec 
alone,  and  not  on  that  province’s  relationship  with  the West  apart  from  the  possibility  that 
Harper himself is seen as the West. 
Now, one might have thought the perception that the Prime Minister was building not a bridge 
but  a Quebec  beachhead would  have  raised  the  ire  of western  Canadian  voters.  Instead,  the 
regional  reaction  has  been  a  mixture  of  disinterest  and  indifference.  This  reaction  can  be 
explained in at least four ways. First, and likely least important, the West’s economic prosperity 
may  have  fostered  a  generosity  of  spirit  absent  in  past  attempts  to  redesign  the  federation. 
Second, there is a general although not unqualified trust that Harper will not sell out the West in 
the  long  run. Third, western Canadians  recognize  that  their electoral  support  cannot deliver a 
majority Conservative government, and if this is what the majority of voters want, they have to 
accept the fact that the Conservative base in Quebec must be expanded. Like it or not, the road 
to  enduring  national  power  leads  through  Quebec.  Fourth,  Quebec  has  been  largely  off  the 
screen  for  western  Canadians  who  pay  little  attention  to  what  is  happening  in  Quebec  and 
believe  that  what  happens  is  of  little  consequence  for  their  own  long‐term  prosperity. 
Conventional national unity debates are seen as a thing of the past, not the future.  
Thus Harper’s moves on the Quebec front are largely unfettered by western Canadian voters or 
their  provincial  governments;  the  Prime Minister  has  been  given  or  has  assumed  a  very  long 
leash in his efforts to transform the Canadian federal system. He is free to deal with Quebec on 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built,  and  provincial  governments  in  Quebec  and  the  West  have  not  been  part  of  the 
construction crew.  If  the desire  is  in  fact to build a bridge, and not simply a stronger electoral 
base in Quebec, then the only bridge builder is Harper and the bridge exists only within his own 
mind. Of course, this is not a bad location for any such bridge, and even if the goal of a bridge is 
apparent  only  to  the  Prime  Minister,  the  structures  that  he  has  been  putting  in  place  have 
concrete reality. Nonetheless, it is almost as if the bridge is being built under a blanket; it is not 
a  secret  agenda,  but  rather  a  structure whose  intent  is  not  visible  even  if  the  building  blocks 
clearly  are.  To  mix  metaphors,  while  the  ground  is  being  prepared  for  a  new  regional 




enough  strength  to withstand  a  change  in  government? Will  the  decentralist  girders  that  the 
Prime Minister has put in place remain if a more centralist government comes to power, such as 
we  would  see  in  the  form  of  a  Liberal/NDP  coalition?  Harper’s  strategy  of  replacing 
intergovernmental negotiations with parliamentary initiatives depends to a large degree on the 
partisan  composition  of  Parliament  and  the  parties  that  animate  it.  If  truly  national  political 
parties can be reconstructed, then those parties and the Parliament within which they operate 
may  have  the  capacity  to  broker  new  federal  relationships  spanning  Quebec  and  the  West. 
Parliamentary  forums  may  replace  intergovernmental  forums,  at  least  to  the  point  of 








The  answer  to  this  latter  question may  depend  on  the  speed  and  intensity  of  the  issues.  For 
example,  increasingly  grim  economic  news  may  reduce  the  wind  in  the  sails  of  the  climate 
change  debate,  and  as  a  consequence  differences  between Quebec  and  at  least  parts  of  the 
West – Alberta and Saskatchewan – may count for less as voters hunker down to protect their 
RRSPs first and the global environment second. In a similar fashion, $200 a barrel oil will be less 
problematic  for  the Canadian  federal  system  if  it  slowly creeps  in by 2025 rather  than  landing 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Here it is worth noting the skepticism of both Lazar and Richards with respect to the durability 
of  recently  introduced  fiscal  arrangements.  If  the  resource  boom  morphs  into  a  structural 
realignment  of  the  Canadian  economy,  if  the  Ontario  bedrocks  upon  which  the  equalization 
system has been built erodes in the face of American protectionism and global competition, the 
strains  on  the  federation  could  be  intense.  Richards  points  out  how  central  equalization 
programs  have  been  to  the  federation  while  also  noting  the  implicit  design  assumption  that 
Ontario cannot be a “have not” province.  If  that assumption  is called  into question, the entire 
equalization edifice may topple.   
At  the  same  time,  the  common  ground  that  Harper  has  tried  to  create  through  a  more 
decentralized state that recognizes Quebec’s specificity is not one that will rest easily with those 
determined to pursue a more radical environmental agenda, or with those who believe that a 
healthy  federation  cannot  tolerate  growing  regional  disparities  in  wealth  and  economic 
opportunity. If Harper’s bridge is required to carry too much traffic too soon, before his “open 
federalism” becomes the new normal, it could spell collapse. 
To  this  point,  few  people  in  either  Quebec  or  the  West  realize  that  a  bridge,  or  at  least  a 
potential bridge is being built between Quebec and the West. Nor, for that matter, do they see 
the  need  for  such  a  structure.  Hopefully,  this  bridge  can  be  unveiled  and  publicized  before 
substantive regional conflict emerges over such issues as global warming, wealth equalization or 
even Senate  reform.  If we don’t need a  constructive dialogue between Quebec and  the West 
today, we certainly will in the years to come. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
